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Introduction
China has been the world's fastest-growing economy for the last three decades. Since economic reforms started in 1978, the economy has shown average real growth of 9.4 per cent per year. Eliminating the most obvious factors of overestimation that the official statistics may contain, Alwyn Young (2003) has estimated this growth as 1.7 percentage points lower, with annual per capita income growth at 6.1 per cent instead of the officially reported 7.8 per cent. 3 Even with Chinese growth rates two or three points lower than This chapter attempts to assess whether fears that China will displace Latin America in the coming decades are well grounded. Several studies have tackled this issue from a microeconomic perspective, comparing factor endowments, export structures or key cost components such as labour or transportation costs. 8 This one takes a different approach. It tries to compare China and Latin America based on the main variables closely associated with growth and/or the ability of countries to attract foreign direct investment, along the lines of recent empirical literature. While this approach does not lend itself to empirical testing, it provides a more comprehensive and balanced view of China's economy, which may be useful both to prospective investors and to practitioners and analysts, especially those already familiar with Latin America.
The chapter argues that China's strengths relative to Latin America derive from the size of the economy, its macroeconomic stability, the abundance of low-cost labour, the rapid expansion of its physical infrastructure and its ability to innovate. China's main weaknesses are by-products of the lack of separation between market and state. This results in poor corporate governance, a fragile financial system and a tendency to misallocate savings, currently manifested through excess investment in many sectors. China also shares several deep deficiencies with Latin America. In both regions, the rule of law is weak, corruption is endemic and education is poor and very poorly distributed. Broadly based innovation is discouraged by the lack of respect for property rights and by norms and practices that inhibit competition. In the medium term, both China's and Latin America's ability to correct their institutional flaws will determine their capacity to achieve higher income levels and fully to integrate into the world economy.
China's Strengths
Countries do not compete, but companies compete, as Paul Krugman (1994) cautions.
China's growth does not occur at the expense of Latin America's, even if some foreign investors have preferred to go to China. In fact, Chinese growth has most certainly been favourable to Latin America, simply because China is the most powerful source of world economic growth. Since 2000, China's contribution to global GDP growth (in purchasingpower-parity terms) has been bigger than that of the United States, and more than half as big as the combined contribution of India, Brazil and Russia, the three next-largest emerging economies (The Economist, 23 March, 2006) . This results in expanded markets and better export prices, especially for primary goods, which are a very important source of external revenue for Latin America. It also results in higher world savings, which help to finance countries with external deficits, as is usually the case for Latin American countries and the United States. The enormous US current-account deficit, which benefits Latin America, can be sustained only by direct external financing from China and other Asian countries.
Consequently, underscoring China's strengths in relation to Latin America is useful for understanding why China is more successful, but it does not mean that conditions in Latin America would be better if China lacked these strengths.
Size
China is the sixth largest economy in the world, and at the growth rates it has enjoyed in recent decades it appears set to become the largest in less than 40 years, based on GDP valued at market exchange rates. With GDP valued at PPP rates, however, it already is the world's second largest economy and will overtake the United States in less than a decade if both countries maintain their current growth rates. China's also has an impressive importance in world trade, because it is more integrated with it than are other countries such as India, Brazil and the United States. These countries' exports and imports are no more than 25 per cent of GDP, but China's trade represents half of its GDP at market value. 9 Size generates advantages because it helps attract foreign investment to exploit the domestic market and produce for export, tapping the enormous supply of labour that is China's most abundant resource. 10 In such a huge economy, companies can exploit the economies of scale in production, transport and marketing that are decisive for penetrating international markets (Hummels, 2004) . The large Chinese cities also offer opportunities to exploit economies of agglomeration, facilitating the formation of company clusters that complement and compete with each other. This factor is crucial for developing and exploiting skilled labour resources and expanding sectors that depend on knowledge and innovation. In China, however, other factors -such as the special status of state companies and the poor innovation climate -prevent companies from fully using these advantages.
Sustained Growth
The best-known international competitiveness indicator is the Growth Because of its construction method, the index tends to relate closely to countries' income levels, which means that richer countries always tend to occupy higher positions. After controlling for income, however, China occupies an extraordinary relative position. In Latin America, only Chile holds a place significantly higher than that predicted by its income level.
Countries that have such good positions tend to grow more rapidly later -and conversely for countries with poor positions. 11 The indicator thus provides a good barometer of the quality of the environment for the future development of productive activity, because it incorporates factors crucial for economic growth, such as macroeconomic stability, the quality of institutions and the environment for technological improvements and innovation.
China's stable macroeconomic environment, especially, makes it stand out in comparison with Latin America. China ranks at 6th according to this indicator, outperforming the typical country of any developing region. The typical Latin American country ranks at 77, revealing Latin America as the region with one of the world's most severe macroeconomic instability, only second to Africa. As is discussed below, the quality of China's institutions and its environment for innovation leave much to be desired, although they are not bad for China's income level.
Underlying the macroeconomic indicator are the level and stability of economic growth and the good risk ratings that international analysts assign to China on the basis of its growth record, low inflation rates, low levels of government debt and the soundness of its international reserves and external balance. Naturally, this has a certain amount of circularity.
Because China has had rapid and stable growth in the past, it receives good risk ratings that maintain the expectation of sustained growth, which becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. The opposite could be said of most Latin American countries. These expectations, however, are a double-edged sword. Although they provide time to solve macroeconomic or structural imbalances, they also tempt countries to ignore them. This could be the case for the weaknesses of the Chinese financial system, addressed further below. It also applies to the repressed appreciation of the renminbi, whereby an excess supply of foreign exchange has given rise to a gargantuan accumulation of international reserves. In 2005 alone, China's international reserves increased by $209 billion, reaching $818.9 billion (or 42.8 per cent of GDP at current prices). 12 This represents a "war chest" that, along with other features of the Chinese economy, offers protection against the risks of a sudden stop in capital flows and other external sector risks. Nevertheless, high reserves exert pressure on the money supply 13 and on the prices of key assets such as real estate, and they may eventually lead to inflation.
What seems to have prevented inflation so far is the combination of fast income growth (which boosts money demand) and rapid productivity increases (which ameliorate the effect of cost increases for labour and other inputs).
Cheap and Abundant Manpower
Abundant cheap labour is China's most evident advantage in attracting foreign investment and exporting manufactures. The average wage in manufacturing was only $141 a month in 2004, 14 lower than the current minimum wage in most Latin American countries (Figure 1-2) . In 1990 the average wage was $36 a month, which implies a 10.2 per cent average annual increase. This does not differ substantially from the economic growth rate of the period (9.7 per cent) or the growth rate of workers' productivity in the overall economy (8.5 per cent). (Brooks and Tao, 2003) . This process is far from exhausted. The inefficient sectors have an estimated 160 million surplus workers, and in the next quarter century the rural population could decline by 300 million people (Wolf, 2003) .
Despite its importance, a multitude of restrictions only gradually being relaxed constrain rural-urban migration. The most important traditional constraint is the system of household registration (hukou), which is required in order to remain in the cities and have access to jobs and the basic services of education, healthcare and social security. 16 Migration has also been limited by emigrants' fear of losing land ownership rights in their rural areas of origin and by the stricter limit in the cities on the permitted number of births per household.
Since 2001, people with stable employment and residents have had permission to register in over 20 000 small towns and cities without fear of losing land rights, and several taxes on migrants have been dismantled. Severe restrictions persist in most large cities, however, and some time will pass before the 2001 reform is fully applied even in the small cities (Brooks and Tao, 2003) .
The movement of labour into more efficient sectors has been the major source of total factor productivity (TFP) increases, which have contributed around 3 per cent per year to GDP growth over the past two decades (Table 1 .1). Based on the differences in average labour productivity between agriculture, manufacturing and the service sector, the OECD has calculated that about one-fourth of the increase in productivity (and one-fifth of the change in income per capita) since 1983 has come from the reallocation of labour. Yet its actual contribution could be higher, since the productivity of the marginal worker who leaves agriculture is estimated at one-sixteenth that of the marginal urban worker. Although the contribution of sectoral change to GDP growth weakened in the second half of the 1990s, it has picked up since 2000 and is certainly far from finished (OECD, 2005) .
Latin America has also witnessed significant rural-urban migration. In 1980, half the population of the typical country of the region lived in the countryside; currently only onethird does so. 17 Yet this migration has not resulted in appreciable increases in productivity. In contrast with China, productivity has had a negative contribution to Latin American growth, especially in the 1980s, but also more recently. The most important exception is Chile, where it has added 1.8 percentage points to average growth in the last 20 years (Loayza et al., 2002) . 18 The shift of employment from country to city has not helped much because of the modest rural-urban labour-productivity gap (typically 30 percent, see IDB, 1998) and because the sectors with the highest productivity in the cities have generated few jobs. As a result, Latin America, unlike China, has not succeeded in using the surplus labour from its inefficient sectors.
One of the reasons for this difference, although clearly not the only one, is the extremely protectionist nature of Latin American labour legislation in comparison with China's or, more accurately, with that in China's dynamic sectors. Latin America regulates in considerable detail the length of the working day as well as vacations and other worker benefits. Laws further govern conditions for the dismissal of workers and the compensation (typically fairly high) that employers must pay when they cannot demonstrate compliance with them. China has no similar national labour code. The traditional "iron rice bowl" system made state companies responsible for the obligations of labour protection and social security, which they independently granted to their workers as a mechanism for maintaining discipline in exchange for life-long job security. These benefits were very generous in other respects too, and they remain an unresolved problem for many companies. This traditional system has led to demands for improvements in pay, non-wage benefits and hiring and dismissal conditions, which vary from region to region and are partly negotiable between private companies and the local authorities and/or the labour unions. Consequently, current labour legislation for private companies provides less protection of employment conditions and job security than typical laws in Latin America, and its application is also much less predictable (OECD, 2003) .
Although China has an enormous reserve of rural labour that could sustain growth during the coming decades, the longer-term prospect is hardly encouraging because of the demographic trends stemming from the one-child policy. For every person over 60 years of age, there are currently some six of working age. This ratio has held for more or less half a century, but it is beginning to fall. By 2040 China will have only two working-age people for every person over 60. Latin America starts from a younger demographic base, so that until 2040 it will keep the six-to-one ratio that China now enjoys (UN, 2002) . China will then confront an enormous social burden that will require it to raise taxes quite far above the levels typical of Latin America.
The Physical Infrastructure Boom
Until 20 years ago China's transport, communications and energy infrastructure was very much below the standard of Latin America's most developed countries. Although serious deficiencies persist and it is difficult to meet the fast-growing demand for infrastructure services of all kinds, recent improvements have been truly noteworthy, especially in roads, ports, telecommunications and electricity, which will likely contribute to sustaining growth. Because of the privatization process, many Latin American countries have also made good progress, although concentrated largely in the areas of telecommunications and, to a lesser extent, electricity and ports. In China, investment in infrastructure has grown much faster than the economy as a whole (rising from 2-3 percent of GDP in the early eighties to around 9 percent in 1998-2002 ). This has not been the case in Latin America, where investment in areas that have not attracted private sector attention has been neglected.
Total (public and private) spending in infrastructure in Latin America is currently less than 2% of its GDP, down from 3.7% during 1980-85. World Bank, 2003a) . This suggests that it is time to look at the other side of the mountain.
China's Weaknesses
The lack of separation between the state and the market is the overriding weakness of the Chinese economy. The state does not just simply interfere strongly in the decisions of other economic agents, as in Latin America before the wave of structural reforms of the last 20 years, but it also is the most important agent in domestic and international production as well as in marketing decisions. In fact, the state remains the main employer and the main channel for the allocation of savings. The lack of separation between the state and the market extends to all aspects of economic activity and is aggravated because the state is not a cohesive, centralised entity but a thousand-headed hydra that operates at all levels. It becomes evident in poor corporate governance, major risks in the financial sector and the use of a variety of controls that favour state-owned enterprises and reduce market discipline.
Overinvestment in many sectors is a current manifestation of inadequate market discipline.
State-Owned Enterprises and Corporate Governance
In China it is not possible to define precisely the dividing line between public and private property. The introduction of non-state forms of production began with the system of rural responsibility that led to the privatisation of agriculture (although not rural land, which remains under state or community control) and to the proliferation of "town and village enterprises," small and medium-sized light manufacturing firms. that the other state companies will necessarily be privatised, but rather that they will have to support themselves. An explicit reform objective is to expand state control capacity through the laws and regulations on ownership and corporate governance. The preferred way to restructure state companies throughout China is to set up an operating company to hold the productive assets. This company is in turn owned by a state-owned holding company. These holding companies exercise control and assume responsibility for the social obligations that all state companies had in the past (education, housing, social security). Many statecontrolled operating companies offer shares on the stock market, a mechanism that in practice also contributes to expanding state control because the minority shareholders lack the rights common in other countries. In addition, the reliability of accounting systems and external auditing is very poor, and the practice of selling shares among holders to manipulate their value is rampant, according to the international indicators of the World Economic Forum.
Moreover, the Corporation Law has been designed to facilitate the corporatisation of state companies, impose earnings reinvestment requirements and restrict the composition of boards of directors in ways detrimental to independent control of private companies.
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Because state-owned enterprises are structured to respond more to the political and strategic objectives of the Communist Party than to market signals, it is not surprising that investment decisions, often flawed, lead to overinvestment. Foreign firms are also encouraged, especially by local governments through a variety of incentives, to invest in sectors that may bring political recognition. Excess capacity is rampant in steel, aluminium and cement, sectors under the control of the government, but it is also noticeable in automobiles, electronics, communications equipment and many other sectors with high foreign participation. The major risk caused by overinvestment is that many state-owned firms may find it impossible to honour their financial commitments to the already overextended official banks.
The Financial System
The financial system, without doubt the Achilles' heel of the Chinese economy, has raising them above levels current in China. Needless to say, the macroeconomic volatility characteristic of Latin American countries is a source of vulnerability that China has not had to face, at least so far. Yet ample evidence shows that financial liberalisations often turn sour in countries that lack adequate institutional infrastructure, because previous systems of interest-rate controls and directed credit may have created weak bank portfolios and failed to promote good "credit cultures" (Caprio and Hanson, 2001) . Such concerns fully apply to China. Research on financial crises has also shown that when basic institutions that govern credit markets are flawed (i.e. when the rule of law is weak, creditors are unprotected and regulation is deficient) liberalisation increases the likelihood of a crisis (Demirgüc-Kunt and Detragiache, 1998; Arteta et al., 2001) . Thus, even as current conditions in the financial sector pose a threat to Chinese stability, reform and eventual liberalisation will not be riskfree either.
Given the difficulties of reforming the financial sector, equity-market liberalisation could in principle make a major difference in China. More financially developed countries experience larger than average boosts from equity-market liberalisation, which suggests that
China could obtain an important benefit. Again, however, this effect tends to be muted in countries like China with poor legal systems and weak investor protection (Bekaert et al., 2004) .
The Trade Regime and International Transactions
Like Latin America, China has drastically cut tariffs and eliminated most restrictions by business people's conviction that they can influence official decisions (Dickson, 2003) .
Common Weaknesses of China and Latin America
With its growing economic weight in the world, its high saving and investment ratios and its prodigious industrial capacity, China can seem like a developed country. Yet it remains an economy with low economic, social and institutional development and as such shares a series of weaknesses with Latin American countries. As economic development progresses, these weaknesses may become more troubling. Some observers even talk of an eventual "Latin Americanisation of China: the possibility that growing income inequalities and an ill-regulated rush to privatize could precipitate economic and political upheaval" (The
Economist, 25 March 2006).

Limited and Unequal Education
The Chinese and Latin American labour forces currently have similar levels of education, a little less than six years on average, according to the well known Barro and Lee (2000) database. China has made rather more rapid progress than Latin America, but both De Ferranti et al., 2003) .
Another common feature of education structures in China and Latin America is the concentration of public expenditure at the tertiary level. In contrast with the United States or South Korea, where public spending per student is less at the tertiary than at the secondary level, Mexico and Chile spend more than twice as much on a university student than a secondary student. In China the gap is 5:1 (De Ferranti et al., 2003) . This reflects the priority that the government gives to higher education in a bid to speed up the country's technological progress. In 2004 China had 13.3 million university students, up from 5.6 million in 2000, engineering and management being the two most popular courses. China had 820 000 students in postgraduate programs (up from 301 000 in 2000), as well as 115 000 students studying abroad (EIU, 2006) . Since nothing comparable is happening in Latin America, the education structures of the two regions seem likely to diverge.
Corruption and Weak Rule of Law
If anything is important for development, institutions and particularly respect for the law and control of corruption predominate (Easterly and Levine, 2002; Rodrik et al., 2002; Dollar and Kraay, 2002) . According to Kaufmann et al. (2005) , respect for the rule of law in China falls well below the world average; it is on a level similar to those of El Salvador or the Dominican Republic and significantly below those of Chile, Costa Rica and Uruguay ( Figure   1-3 ). This measure of the rule of law synthesizes various indicators and expert opinions that reflect the degree of respect for rules, contracts, legal security and property, as well as the backing of the judicial system. On control of corruption China ranks even lower, on a level with the Dominican Republic, Jamaica and Honduras and substantially below Chile, Costa
Rica and Uruguay ( Figure 1 -4) . In this system of indicators, corruption means the unlawful appropriation of public resources for private purposes. Although the rule of law is almost as weak in China as in the average Latin American country, the problem manifests itself with appreciable differences. In Latin America the homicide rate in the average country is 13 per 100 000 people; in China it is only 2.2 (IDB, 2000; Interpol, 2004) . China also has low rates of other forms of violence and anti-social behaviour, such as robbery or sexual crime, which traditionally have been strongly punished.
In China the weak rule of law becomes much more evident in the lack of secure property rights, especially in rural areas, the weakness of contracts and the unpredictability of judicial decisions.
Although the judicial systems of both China and Latin America suffer from serious weaknesses, these deficiencies have radically different origins. In Latin America, justice operates with complex and formalistic procedures derived from the Napoleonic Code that delay decisions, lessen their transparency and limit access to the courts. Because of this legalistic tradition, lawyers are numerous and play an important role in economic activities.
China, on the other hand, has no tradition of this kind. During the Mao Zedong period the law remained subordinate to political ideology, and the judicial system hardly existed, although national and local authorities controlled summary judicial mechanisms and mediation systems.
Since 1978, a body of laws has been created by transplant from abroad with little adaptation, and an incipient legal tradition has slowly begun to emerge. In 1985 there were only 13 403 qualified lawyers in all of China, and half of them worked only part time. By 2000 the number had risen to 117 260, mainly full-time. Nonetheless, it is mistaken to think that the rule of law will prevail as a direct result of the number of lawyers, courts and cases settled. Except in some of the large coastal cities, most of the more than 200 000 judges in China are retired officials of the People's Liberation Army who lack legal training and independence. Even more serious, the incipient legal system seems alien to Chinese cultural tradition. As one report has noted, "In many respects it is like a transplant or graft that is in danger of being rejected by the many natural antibodies it encounters." (OECD, 2003, p. 113) In both China and Latin America, legal gaps and the lack of consistency and credibility of judicial decisions militate against a broad-based system of innovation.
Protection of intellectual property rights is weak and ineffectual. Even so, China has made substantial progress in the last 20 years by setting up specialised courts to deal with property rights, and a patent registration system has gained credibility, as reflected in the growth of applications (over 170 000 in 2000). Like Latin America, however, China has not yet assimilated a culture of respect for international intellectual property, while the rules for the protection of patents, trademarks and commercial rights are imprecise and of limited effect (OECD, 2003) .
A judicial system such as China's is hardly immune to corruption. More generally, however, the problem of corruption in China stems from the omnipresence of the state in its attempt to control economic decisions to preserve the power of the Communist Party. The reform process initiated in the late 1970s has prompted continuous conflict between the need to create new spaces for decision-making by economic agents to improve efficiency and the expansion of potential sources of illegal income in the effort to maintain state control over other spaces. The land-ownership control system still in force provides a good example.
Corruption originates in two simple facts: all land is owned by the state, and administrative decision determines the value of rights of use. As a result, access to land is difficult without illegal payments to the district or municipal officials who control rights of use. A press source reported that 84 per cent of sales of land rights in Shanghai in recent years occurred through illegal mechanisms (China Economic Quarterly, 2003) . Other recognized areas of corruption are residence permits, customs and banks. A striking and especially problematic feature of corruption in China lies in its growing decentralisation as a result of the erosion of central state control over sub-national entities and their officials in the wake of the growth and diversification of private economic activity.
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Conclusion
China's rapid growth, its ability to attract foreign investment and its success as an exporter all cause concern among entrepreneurs and governments in Latin America. Although it is wrong to believe that good performance by one country comes at the expense of others, China is forcing Latin America rapidly to restructure some of its productive sectors in order to defend its position in international markets. This chapter has shown that China enjoys great strengths relative to Latin America, deriving from the size of its economy, the macroeconomic stability that it has enjoyed so far, the abundance of low-cost labour, the rapid expansion of its transport, electricity and communications infrastructure and its ability to innovate. Yet China also has weaknesses. Their principal source lies in the lack of separation between market and state, which explains the inefficiency of China's state enterprises, the deficiencies of its corporate norms and the fragility of its enormous financial system (the economy's high level of savings notwithstanding). In several ways the Chinese economy does not differ substantially from that of the typical Latin American country. The rule of law is weak and corruption is endemic. Education is poor and very poorly distributed, despite important scientific and technical advances at the university level. The lack of respect for property rights, the difficulty of starting businesses and the norms and practices that inhibit competition all conspire against innovation. Thus public institutions will be the battlefield in the attempt by both regions to attract foreign direct investment and create environments conducive to private initiative.
